Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is an industrial control automated system. It is built with multiple Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). PLC is a special form of microprocessor-based controller with proprietary operating system. Due to the unique architecture of PLC, traditional digital forensic tools are difficult to be applied. In this paper, we propose a program called Control Program Logic Change Detector (CPLCD), which works with a set of Detection Rules (DRs) to detect and record undesired incidents on interfering normal operations of PLC. In order to prove the feasibility of our solution, we set up two experiments for detecting two common PLC attacks. Moreover, we illustrate how CPLCD and network analyzer Wireshark could work together for performing digital forensic investigation on PLC.
INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics plays an important role for incident investigations on digital devices, for example, personal computer, smart-phone, digital camera, and flash drive. Standard guidelines and procedures are provided to implement the digital forensic processes: identification, collection, analysis and reporting [11] . According to the collected evidence, investigators can re-construct the incident and present to a court if crime is involved. In addition, the evidence can be used to trace what causes the incidents in order to avoid the same incident happening again in the future [2] .
A programmable logic controller (PLC) is a special form of microprocessor-based controller. It uses a programmable memory to store instructions and to implement functions such as logic, sequencing, timing, counting and arithmetic in order to control machines and processes [1] . Lighting Control system is one example of PLC applications. It is used to turn lights on automatically when the area becomes occupied and off when it becomes unoccupied.
A simple automation control system can be monitored and controlled by a single PLC. However, a complex and larger automation control system called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, needs to be built with multiple PLCs. SCADA system is an automation system widely used to monitor and control industrial processes such as electric power generation, public transportation, chemical plants, water management and so on. If any undesired incidents occur on the SCADA systems, substantial risk to the health and safety of human lives, serious damage to the environment, as well as serious financial © 2015 ADFSL issues such as production losses, negative impact to a nation's economy, and compromise of proprietary information [2] .
SCADA systems are always built with proprietary technologies and communication protocols. For example, PLC manufacturers provide its proprietary operating systems to their products. Due to the uniqueness of SCADA system, there are several challenges when performing digital forensic processes on these systems. Those challenges will be discussed in Section 4. In this paper, we propose a solution to detect and record abnormal operations of PLC based on the control program logic change in PLC. The abnormal operations are stored in the format of a log file which could help SCADA forensic investigation.
SECURITY ISSUES OF PLC
An automation control system can be setup by connecting a PLC with Input and Output devices. Input devices might be switches, temperature sensors, flow sensors, etc. Output devices might be motors, solenoid valves, etc. Besides hardware installation, the PLC has to be programmed in order to monitor the inputs and control the outputs based on a set of control rules. Each PLC manufacturer has its own software for programming their PLCs. For example, PLCs of Siemens Simatic S7 series are programmed, configured, and managed using software STEP 7.
Nowadays, many PLCs have evolved to utilize common networking standard such as Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) and Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) for communication among the connected devices [3] . Therefore, cyber-attacks on SCADA systems become one of the important security issues after the systems have been exposed to the Internet. 
ATTACKS ON PLCS

DIGITAL FORENSICS CHALLENGES ON SCADA SYSTEMS
Cyber forensics can be challenging when being applied to non-traditional environments like SCADA systems. The systems are not comprised of current information technologies and not designed with technologies to provide adequate data storage or audit capabilities. In addition, further complexity is introduced if the environment is designed using proprietary solutions and protocols, thus limiting the ease of which modern forensic methods can be utilized [11] .
Due to the complexity of SCADA systems, evidence is difficult or impossible to be extracted and collected by using traditional digital forensics for investigation. One of the challenges is that the operations of SCADA systems must be kept running, therefore, investigators cannot shut down the system to perform data acquisition [2] . In such situation, live forensics is the possible way to perform data acquisition. However, performing live forensics on SCADA systems might affect its normal operations. The second challenge is that many SCADA systems use proprietary and legacy software, hardware and communication protocols. Therefore, traditional digital forensic tools might not be able to apply to the systems. Furthermore, SCADA forensics is lack of event logs for investigation 
LADDER LOGIC PROGRAMMING
PLC is designed to be operated by engineers. The engineers are good at electrical circuit design but might have limited knowledge of computer programming. Meanwhile, different kinds of automation control systems need different kinds of PLC control programs. Therefore, Ladder Logic (LAD) is the most common programming Language for PLC because the programming language looks like a simple wiring diagram for an electrical circuit [1] .
A LAD diagram in Figure 1 consists of a set of ladder rungs and each rung has a set of input instructions and output instructions [1] . The ladder diagram has two vertical rails. The left vertical rail supplies power to all the horizontal rungs of the ladder. Each rung on the ladder defines one operation in the control process.
A LAD diagram is read from top to bottom and left to right. Each rung must start with an input or inputs and must end with at least one © 2015 ADFSL output. The input is used for a control action, such as closing the contact of a switch. The output is used for a device connected to the output of a PLC such as a motor or a valve. In Figure 1 Figure 1 .
If the PLC operations do not follow the instructions of the control program, we assume the PLC might suffer from attacks or PLC failure. Followings are the procedures for detecting the two PLC attacks using CPLCD and DRs. Assume the PLC control program is same as Figure 1 . CPLCD is able to perform real-time PLC attack detection on a running PLC and capture the attack details in a log file for forensic investigation.
In order to prove the feasibility of our solution, we set up two experiments for detecting the two attacks. Experiment 1 is for detecting the Control Program Attack and Experiment 2 is for detecting Memory Read and Write Logic Attack. As Siemens is one of the popular PLC manufacturers, we select Siemens Simatic S7-1200 for our experiments.
Experiment 1: Setup and procedures for detecting Control Program Attack
To set up this experiment, we used one PLC, one PC and a router. They were connected as diagram shown in Figure 2 . The PC was installed with CPLCD for detecting the attack.
The procedures for detecting the attack were as follows:
Step 1: Designed two control programs. One was the original program in Figure 4 and the other one was altered by an attacker in Figure 5 to create abnormal instructions. The attacker altered the second rung of the original control program from (I0.1 AND M0.1) = Q0.1 to (I0.1 OR M0.1) = Q0.1
Step 2 Step 3: Loaded the altered control program with initial memory values, M0.1=False and Input I0.1=True into the Siemens Simatic S7-1200 PLC by Siemens programming software STEP 7 and started running the PLC.
Step 4: Started the CPLCD program with the defined DRs to monitor memory variables of the control program in the PLC and check any DR was violated by the values of the variables.
Step 5: An alert was raised, checked error log file of CPLCD as shown in Figure 3 .
Experiment 1: Result
According to the error log captured by CPLCD in Figure 3, 
Experiment 2: Setup and procedures for detecting Memory Read and Write Logic Attack
This experiment setup was same as Experiment 1 but one more PC was added as shown in Figure 7 . The PC installed with Snap7 acting as an Attacker to perform Memory Read and Write Logic Attack. We used Snap7 to alter the PLC's memory data. Snap7 is not a PLC attacking tool, it is an open source, 32/64 bit, multi-platform Ethernet communication suite for interfacing natively with Siemens S7 PLCs [7] . © 2015 ADFSL
Step 1: Designed a control program ( Figure  6 ) and load the control program into the PLC. Set initial value of Input I0.0, I0.1, I0.2, I0.3 and I0.4 to False so that Output Q0.0 and Q0.1 were False, and then started running the PLC. Step 3: Started the CPLCD program with the defined DRs to monitor memory variables of the PLC control program and check any DR was violated by the values of the variables.
Step 4: Used Snap7 to alter the PLC's memory Output Q0.0 and Q0.1 to True from False.
Step 5: An alert was raised, checked error log file of CPLCD as shown in Figure 8 . 
Experiment 2: Result
According to the error log captured by CPLCD in Figure 8 Telegram) consists of a header, a set of parameters (Params), a parameters data (Pardata) and a data block (Data) as shown in Figure 8 . The According to the S7 Protocols specifications and the well-known encapsulation rule, forensic investigator is able to construct useful information from the TCP/IP data packets for investigation.
Following is a case to illustrate how CPLCD and Wireshark work together for forensic investigation on cyber-attack to a PLC. A PLC controls a motor (Q0.0) by two switches (I0.0 and I0.1). The motor is ON only when the two switches are ON, otherwise it is OFF. Therefore, the DR is "I0.0 AND I0.1 = Q0.0". Assuming an attacker tries to turn on the motor by altering Output Q0.0 from FALSE to TRUE when both input switches are OFF (FALSE).
Before Attack:
The switches are OFF and the Motor is OFF.
The DR is "FALSE AND FALSE = FALSE".
After Attack:
The switches are OFF but the Motor is ON.
The DR "FALSE AND FALSE = TRUE" is violated.
Since the DR is violated after the attack, CPLCD raises an alert and logs the variable names/values and timestamp on a file. A forensic investigator can use the timestamp to filter out the relevant packets from the file captured by Wireshark. Based on the analysis of those network packets, the investigator can trace what and how the S7 commands were executed to attack the PLC. Besides, we might be able to reveal the IP address of the attacker in this way.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
PLC is one of the important components in SCADA systems but lack of security control and hard to perform digital forensics on it. It is facing many cyber-attacks after exposing SCADA systems to Internet dramatically in recent years. Siemens is aware of the security issues and provides warning on Simatic S7-1200 Manual "If an attacker can physically access your networks, the attacker can possibly read and write data" [12] .
Digital Forensics is an essential part of cyber defense and becomes relevant when there is a security breach [10] . However, there are insufficient forensic tools and procedures to perform digital forensics on PLC. To help In future, we will apply CPLCD to various types and brands of PLCs for testing of performance, accuracy and feasibility. Furthermore, we will expand our testing to a simulated control system application such as elevator, traffic light, robotic arm, etc.
